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A Confession of Faith:
Notes Toward a New Humanism
Eileen A. Joy and Christine M. Neufeld
“To dwell in the ruins of the University is to try to do what we
can, while leaving space for what we cannot envisage to emerge
. . . [and] resources liberated by the opening up of disciplinary
space, be it under the rubric of the humanities or of Cultural
Studies, should be channeled into supporting short-term collab-
orative projects of both teaching and research (to speak in fa-
miliar terms) which would be abandoned after a certain period,
whatever their success.”
—Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (176)
“This will no doubt be like a profession of faith: the profession
of faith of a professor who would act as if he were nevertheless
asking your permission to be unfaithful or a traitor to his habit-
ual practice.”
—Jacques Derrida,
“The University Without Condition” (202)
In his important book The University in Ruins, published two years after
his untimely death in 1994, Bill Readings argued that, partly due to a cer-
tain state of affairs which he termed both “Americanization” and “global-
ization,” whereby “the rule of the cash nexus” has replaced “the notion of
national identity as a determinant in all aspects of social life,” the Univer-
sity has become a “transnational bureaucratic corporation” and “the cen-
trality of the traditional humanistic disciplines to the life of the University
is no longer assured” (3). Further, the University “is no longer linked to
the destiny of the nation-state by virtue of its role as producer, protector,
and inculcator of an idea of national culture,” and as a result, “the grand
narrative of the University, centered on the production of a liberal, reason-
ing subject, is no longer available to us” (3, 9). Ultimately, the University
is “a ruined institution, one that lost its historical raison d’etre,” but which
nevertheless “opens up a space in which it is possible to think the notion
of community otherwise, without recourse to notions of unity, consensus,
and communication” (19, 20). This is a space, moreover, where the Uni-
versity “becomes one site among others where the question of being-
together is raised, raised with an urgency that proceeds from the absence
of the institutional forms (such as the nation-state), which have histori-
cally served to mask that question” (20).
Although Readings’ argument in The University in Ruins has been sub-
ject to carefully considered counter-critique,1 it remains today, we would
argue, a powerful spur to thought and action for those working within the
academy who are concerned with the future of humanistic teaching and
scholarship. One could say, as we do, that Readings’ emphasis on (and
hope for) the University as “one site among others where the question of
being-together is raised” is an emphasis (and hope) that is under a certain
pressure from work within the humanities, social sciences, and sciences on
posthumanism, post-individual personhood, and even, post-histoire.2 For
before we can even begin to raise the question of being-together we must
first raise the question of the being that could find or wish itself with oth-
ers, and to what end? In her classical defense of a reform in liberal educa-
tion that would emphasize global citizenship and a deep sensitivity to and
embrace of human diversity, Cultivating Humanity, Martha Nussbaum ar-
gues that becoming an educated citizen means, in addition to “mastering
techniques of reason,” also “learning how to be a human being capable of
love and imagination” (14). But how can this singular human being to
whom Nussbaum refers situate herself in a world where, as the philoso-
pher of religion John Caputo writes, “one has lost one’s faith in grand réc-
its,” and “[b]eing, presence, ouisa, the transcendental signified, History,
Man—the list goes on—have all become dreams?” (6). For Caputo, “we
are in a fix, except that even to say ‘we’ is to get into a still deeper fix. We
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are in the fix that cannot say ‘we’,” and yet, “the obligation of me to you
and of both of us to others . . . is all around us, on every side, constantly
tugging at our sleeves, calling upon us for a response” (6).
For those of us who work within the humanities in the public (or pri-
vate) university setting, the question of obligation can weigh heavily—as
teachers, as scholars speaking to specialized audiences, and as public in-
tellectuals. Although it is possible to slip so far into one’s own highly spe-
cialized and arcane area of research that nothing else seems to matter
much, and “effective outcomes” or material results can often be, with
good reason, beside the point, Jacob Marley’s self-incriminating reproach
to Ebeneezer Scrooge that “the world should have been my business,” is
never too far removed from our thoughts. Indeed, we would agree with
John McGowan that,
[t]he term “public intellectual” is redundant. There is—and
can be—no such thing as a private intellectual. An intellec-
tual is someone who, by way of words and arguments, aims
to influence others. Like Diogenes in search of an honest
man, the intellectual is always in search of a public, an au-
dience. (47)
But how can we effectively communicate our work and thought to a “pub-
lic” that is made up of so many diverse and competing pluralities at a time
when, as the political theorist William Connolly writes, the Kantian idea
of regulative reason “embraces a profoundly contestable metaphysic dur-
ing a time in which the global variety of religious/metaphysical perspec-
tives is both visible and palpable” and most contemporary issues are “un-
susceptible to resolution by one country, one faith, or one philosophy”
(196, 201)? And what would it mean to communicate our ideas, effec-
tively, to even one person when, if certain robotics and artificial intelli-
gence scientists such as Rodney Brooks and Hans Moravec are right, the
days of the human person are numbered?3 Or, if philosophers of science
such as Nick Bostrom, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Ox-
ford University, are right and the end of the human person, as currently de-
signed, is devoutly to be wished? As Bostrom himself puts it, “it could be
good for most human beings to become posthuman” (24), by which he
means, to become “humans” who, through the aid of various technologies,
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have increased intellectual and physical capacities, never age, and never
die.4 And if this were to actually happen, it would present a profound chal-
lenge to cultural theorists and public intellectuals such as Terry Eagleton,
who believe that it is “our perishing, not our bestowals of meaning, which
is necessary” to understanding our “creaturely nature” and the world in
which we live (163).
But we don’t have to dwell too long with the dreamer-scientists of
brave new futures to be convinced that the days of the human person are
numbered, for the elegant work of deconstructing this animal—of lifting
the confused brute out of his prettily built narrative skyscrapers of ratio,
traditio, liberalis humanitas, natio, and so forth, and of laying bare his in-
coherencies and tyrannies and well-crafted hedges against nothingness—
has been well accomplished for a long time now in various of the disci-
plines of the humanities, the social sciences, and the fine arts. Tracing the
dissolution of the liberal humanist subject and the emergence of “virtual
bodies” in the sciences of cybernetics, informatics, and artificial life in her
book How We Became Posthuman, Katherine Hayles notes that 
[t]he liberal humanist subject has . . . been cogently criti-
cized from a number of perspectives. Feminist theorists
have pointed out that it has historically been constructed as
a white European male, presuming a universality that has
worked to suppress and disenfranchise women’s voices;
postcolonial theorists have taken issue not only with the
universality of the (white male) liberal subject but also with
the very idea of a unified, consistent identity, focusing in-
stead on hybridity; and postmodern theorists such as Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari have linked it with capitalism,
arguing for the liberatory potential of a dispersed subjectiv-
ity distributed among diverse desiring machines they call
“bodies without organs.” (4)5
And what the posthuman view offers in place of a liberal humanist subject
that was already being dismantled long before sciences such as cybernet-
ics were being developed, is “emergence” instead of teleology, “distrib-
uted cognition” instead of “autonomous will,” and “system” instead of
“self” (Hayles 288, 290). This state of affairs poses a great challenge to
those who believe, as the political philosopher George Kateb does, that
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“the individual is the moral center of American life,” and further, that “the
actuality of the American democracy” depends upon the idea that “the in-
dividual is important or prior or precious or sacred” (77). But if this indi-
vidual, who is so central to democracy, is, as Foucault has famously de-
scribed, “a product of power,” then what democracy may need now “is to
‘de-individualize’ by means of multiplication and displacement” (1977,
xiv).
But it may also be, as certain prominent social theorists argue, that late
capitalist modernity has brought about a situation in which the displaced
individual is too much with us, or with herself: According to Zygmunt
Bauman, whereas in the premodern era one was born into her identity, in
late modernity (which Bauman terms “liquid”) a fixed and normative so-
cial standing is replaced with “compulsive and obligatory self-determina-
tion” (2002, xv), and the end result is “a combined experience of insecu-
rity (of position, entitlements and livelihood), of uncertainty (as to their
continuation and future stability) and of unsafety (of one’s body, one’s self
and their extensions: possessions, neighbourhood, community)” (2000,
161).6 For Scott Lash, whereas the individual of the “first” Enlightenment
modernity was institutionalized through “property, contract, the bourgeois
family and civil society,” the individual of the “second” informational
modernity is destabilized through the “retreat of classic institutions: state,
class, nuclear family, ethnic group” and through the general indeterminacy
of knowledge, such that she begins to spin in perpetual, self-reflexive mo-
tion (vii, ix–x).7 In their book, Individualization, Ulrich Beck and Elisa-
beth Beck-Gernsheim define “individualization” as a “non-linear, open-
ended, highly ambivalent, ongoing process” in which, supposedly for the
first time in human history, “the individual is becoming the basic unit of
social reproduction” (xxii).8 Moreover, individualization needs to be un-
derstood as “the beginning of a new mode of societalization, a kind of
‘metamorphosis’ or ‘categorical shift’ in the relation between the individ-
ual and society” (Beck 1992, 127). Modernization leads to the individual’s
“disembedding,” or “removal from historically prescribed social forms
and commitments in the sense of traditional contexts of dominance and
support (the ‘liberating dimension’),” and also leads to “the loss of tradi-
tional security with respect to practical knowledge, faith and guiding
norms (the ‘disenchantment dimension’)” (Beck 1992, 128). According to
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, the late modern individual is ultimately “self
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insufficient and increasingly tied to others, including at the level of world-
wide networks and institutions,” and the so-called “freedom culture,” in
which each person supposedly has a right “to a life of his or her own . . . is
being destroyed by capitalism” (xxi, xxiii), by what the anthropologist
Jonathan Friedman terms a “postmodern-modern-consumptionist” culture
in which there is a “narcissistic dependency on the presentation of the self
via the commodity construction of identity” (361). This is a culture, in
Bauman’s view, in which consumerism is no longer about a “measurable
set of articulated needs,” but about “a much more volatile and ephemeral,
evasive and capricious, and essentially non-referential” desire, or wish, to
shop, to buy, and freedom is “translated above all as the plenitude of con-
sumer choice and as the ability to treat any life decision as a consumer
choice” (2000, 74, 89). The human being, finally, is “a choice among pos-
sibilities, a homo optinis” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 5).
There are some sociologists, however, such as Niklas Luhmann, for
whom this conception of capitalism giving rise to an impersonal mass so-
ciety in which the individual is always and precariously too much on her
own (while also not being in full possession of herself) is too narrowly de-
fined. For Luhmann, the very impersonality that grounds capitalist moder-
nity also opens the way “for more intensive personal relationships,” partly
because the very processes of individualization that Beck and Beck-Gern-
sheim outline, in which the world becomes overwhelmingly complex and
impenetrable and dangerous, simultaneously brings about a situation in
which there is a “need for a world that is still understandable, intimate and
close,” and for which world “a common medium of communication . . .
which employs the semantic fields of friendship and love” is necessary
(12, 16, 17). Moreover, according to political theorist Jane Bennett, mod-
ern life, despite its narratives of a disenchanted and meaningless world,
contains multiple sites, or portals, through which we can cultivate “affec-
tive fascination.” Interspecies encounters, Epicurean materialism, eco-
spiritualism, Deleuze and Guattari’s “body without organs” (or, self-
rehybridization), mass entertainments and commodities, and virtual reali-
ties (literary, scientific, and technological), for Bennett, provide opportu-
nities for wonder and enchantment, without which “we might not have the
energy and inspiration . . . to respond generously to humans and nonhu-
mans that challenge our settled identities” (174).
But how does love, or wonder—no matter how many intimate and
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enchanted worlds they might create—ultimately fare against impersonal
power? In his book Homo Sacer: Bare Life and Sovereign Power, Giorgio
Agamben has decisively shown that, long before modernity, the individual
has always been in a precarious position as regards her “right to life,” es-
pecially when the full rights of citizenship do not attain to persons living
within or on the margins of established states, and who then can be
marked as not fully “human”: these are the exiles, the economically disen-
franchised, the displaced persons, sans papiers, the refugees, asylum seek-
ers, illegal immigrants, maquileros zone workers, and “enemy combat-
ants” held in secret prisons who live beside us today, but who in the past,
were the friedlos (“[person] without peace” in ancient Germanic law), the
wargus (“werewolf” in medieval Frankish law codes), and the utlah or
æl∂eodigne (“outlaw” and “alien person” in Anglo-Saxon law codes), and
who were available to be killed as if they were animals. In contrast to the
classical world, where “bare life” (zoµe) was “excluded from the polis in
the strict sense,” remaining “confined—as merely reproductive life—to
the sphere of the oikos, ‘home’,” events such as the Holocaust or Roe v.
Wade have shown us that “the politicization of bare life as such . . . con-
stitutes the decisive event” of modernity (Agamben 2, 4). Or, as Foucault
puts it, while for ages “man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living
animal with the additional capacity for political existence,” modern man
“is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being in ques-
tion” (1976, 188). And yet, to come back around to science, we now have
to take into account the myriad ways in which biotechnology and various
neurosciences have called even what we might term “bare life” into ques-
tion—current debates over stem cell research foreground this fact, as do
popular books written by eminent scientists in which the human body and
mind are described as “a colony of genes,” a “survival machine”
(Dawkins), “a system of organs of computation” (Pinker), and an “au-
topoietic system” (Maturana and Varela).
The idea, espoused by the biologist Francesco Varela, that “the ‘self’ is
a story consciousness tells itself to block out the fear and panic that would
ensue if human beings realized there is no essential self” (Hayles 156),
and further, that the mind is not a “unified, homogeneous unity, nor even 
. . . a collection of entities,” but is rather, “a disunified, heterogeneous, col-
lection of processes” (Varela et al. 100),9 accords well with recent work in
the humanities in queer theory, which emphasizes, in the words of
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medieval studies scholar Jeffrey Cohen, “the contingency of identities that
have so far successfully passed as solid, monolithic, timeless” (2003, 38).
For Cohen and other humanities scholars, queer theory, especially of cer-
tain Foucauldian and Deleuzan-Guttarian bents, helps us to see “the limits
of the human as a conceptual category and demarcates a new terrain . . .
where identity, sexuality, and desire are no longer constrained by ontology,
‘muscle,’ or lonely residence in a merely human body” (2003, 77).
Cohen’s thinking resonates with cultural theorists Judith Halberstam’s and
Ira Livingston’s posthumanism, in which the human body itself “is no
longer part of ‘the family of man’ but a zoo of posthumanities,” “sexuality
is a dispersed relation between bodies and things,” and there is no such
thing as singular self, only assembled some-nesses of being and becoming
(3, 38).10 Just as in Varela’s theory of “enaction,” in which the cognitive
structures of a self-enclosed biological organism, such as a “human,”
emerges out of nonlinear, dynamic, and sensory-motor interactions with
its environment,11 so for Judith Butler and other queer theorists, the “par-
ticular sociality that belongs to bodily life . . . establishes a field of ethical
enmeshment with others and a sense of disorientation for the first-person,
that is, the perspective of the ego. As bodies, we are always for something
more than, and other than, ourselves” (Butler 25).12 As Jeffrey Cohen and
Todd Ramlow explicate Butler, this “disorientation” suggests “a process
not collapsible to either side of a self/other binary, a process always in mo-
tion, changing (performatively) in multiple contexts. More radically, the
pack or multiplicity establishes the very ground of possibility for politics
and agency.” But in order for this “pack or multiplicity” to emerge, one of
the first divides that has to be dismantled is that between “human” and
“non-human,” and we must learn “to live and embrace the destruction and
rearticulation of the human in the name of a more capacious, and . . . less
violent world, not knowing in advance what precise forms our humanness
does and will take” (Butler 35).
Not knowing in advance what precise forms our humanness does and
will take. It is precisely to this statement of Butler’s, which is also a defer-
ral of any demand for a specific answer to what, exactly, today or tomor-
row, determines the human, that the BABEL Working Group (hereafter re-
ferred to as BABEL) addresses itself.13 Founded in 2004 as a loosely
organized collective of scholars working in medieval literary and histori-
cal studies, BABEL is devoted to creating new venues for bringing
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together scholars working in the humanities, especially in but not limited
to classical and medieval studies, with social scientists and researchers
working in the more “hard” sciences, in order to formulate new paradigms
for humanistic study at the university level and to develop and advocate
for a “new humanism” that would be theoretically rigorous, scientifically
sound, technologically adept, and ethically capacious. BABEL represents,
further, a collective desire on the part of a certain group of medievalists
for a more present-minded medieval studies but also for a more histori-
cally-minded contemporary humanities.
Scholars working in literary studies have long been discussing how
changes in technology will affect the transmission and production of hu-
manistic knowledge, and have even been leaders in the digitization of
manuscripts and archives of texts.14 They have also more recently begun
to develop an impressive and growing body of scholarship on what is
being called cognitive literary studies or cognitive linguistics, in which, as
Mark Turner writes, the study of English is being “reframed” so that it can
be seen “as inseparable from the discovery of mind, participating and even
leading the way in that discovery, gaining new analytic instruments for its
traditional work and developing new concepts of its role” (1991, n.p.).15
Moreover, humanists cannot be accused of having neglected, in their
scholarly reflection and writing, the newer sciences such as genetic engi-
neering, artificial intelligence, psycho-pharmacology, robotics, bioinfor-
matics, and the like—indeed, these sciences have increasingly become a
serious preoccupation for critical theorists, literary scholars, and historians
alike.16 And yet, at the same time, there is a growing body of scientists,
led by John Brockman, co-founder of the scientific collective Edge17 and
the editor of the essay collections The Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific
Revolution and New Humanists: Scientists at the Edge, who argue that it
has become necessary for scientists and “other thinkers in the empirical
world” to “take the place of the traditional intellectual in rendering visible
the deeper meanings of our lives, redefining who and what we are”
(Brockman, “The New Humanists”). In Brockman’s view, traditional hu-
manities scholars are so exhaustively insular and hermeneutic that they
have apparently lost sight of the “real world” and have abdicated their re-
sponsibility to elucidate the important philosophical questions regarding
human nature, mind and body, identity, ontology, time, and the like.
BABEL was formed partly to counter Brockman’s claim that “traditional
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humanities academicians . . . have so marginalized themselves that they
are no longer within shouting distance of the action” (“The New Human-
ists”), but also to assert the relevance of medieval studies to scholars
working in more modern humanistic fields for whom, in the words of
Glenn Burger and Steven Kruger, “the postmodern has often been too eas-
ily proposed as a radical movement beyond a [medieval] history thought
somehow to have come to an end” (xiv). It is BABEL’s aim to demon-
strate the important relevance of premodern studies to pressing contempo-
rary questions and issues, especially those that circulate around the vexed
terms, “human,” “humanity,” “humanism,” and “the humanities.”
In recent years, there has been a growing body of humanistic scholar-
ship on corporality and the so-called crisis of the category “human,” both
in modern and premodern studies. And yet, while late antiquity and me-
dieval studies scholars have often taken their cues in this field of research
from modern theorists such as Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Jean Bau-
drillard, Judith Butler, Thomas Laqueur, Donna Haraway, Elizabeth
Grosz, and the like, with the sole exception of what has become a kind of
de rigeur nod to the work of Peter Brown and Caroline Walker Bynum,18
modern theorists rarely turn to premodern studies for insights into ques-
tions revolving around what the sociologist Bryan S. Turner has termed
“sociology of the body” and what many term “the turn to the body.”19 In
fact, in The Hedgehog Review, in a special issue devoted to “The Body
and Being Human,” Jeffrey Tatum indicates that “[i]nterest in the interplay
between body and society has a long history,” by which he means, it be-
gins with thinkers like Marx, Engels, Weber, and Freud (126). Further, in
the bibliography appended to Tatum’s essay that highlights the supposedly
best and most important scholarly work devoted to the human body since
the 1960s, not a single work from classical or medieval studies is included.
And yet, in recent years there has been an explosion in late antiquity and
medieval studies in work on corporality, “humanness,” and the sociology
of the body—so much so that it would be an immense undertaking to list
all of the titles here. How, BABEL asks, might “the turn to the body” in
medieval studies join “the turn to the posthuman” in more contemporary
theoretical studies, as well as in the sciences and social sciences, in order
to help current ideas regarding the human body, and human person, bene-
fit from a longer historical perspective? How, further, could we explore,
together, the “traumas, exclusions, [and] violences enacted centuries ago”
170 J N T
that “might still linger in contemporary identity formations,” and also see,
with changed eyes, a past that “could be multiple and valuable enough to
contain (and be contained within) alternative presents and futures” (Cohen
2000, 3)?
Much of the contemporary debates over posthumanism have mainly
focused on the ways in which new biotechnologies and new findings in the
cognitive sciences have complicated how we conceptualize and enact our
human identities, ushering in the language of crisis over the supposed
destabilization of the category “human,” in its biological, social, and polit-
ical aspects.20 This same posthuman turn has also, in some science circles,
led to a language of giddiness and elation over all the ways in which we—
whatever “we” might be—might finally be able to escape or transcend the
death-haunted trap of our corporal bodies. Cohen has argued, provoca-
tively, that the Middle Ages were already posthuman, for it was a period
fascinated with composite and monstrous bodies, and with the transforma-
tions between human and inhuman, corporal and more abstract substances.
Further, there is a wide variety of medieval texts which demonstrate that,
even in the Middle Ages, human identity was, “despite the best efforts of
those who possess it to assert otherwise—unstable, contingent, hybrid,
discontinuous” (Cohen 2003, xxiii). With this idea in mind—of both a
posthuman Middle Ages and a posthuman modernity, neither of which is
entirely free of concepts, identities, and social forms that are both alive
and dead at once—BABEL decided to formulate a set of questions to
which we would address our collective efforts into an indeterminate
future:
• Can we have humanism, or the humanities, or human rights, without
the human?
• How does the concept (or, reality) of the posthuman impact the ways
we develop our notions of humanism, both past and present?
• How do the various historical traditions of humanism (classical, me-
dieval, and early modern) productively and antagonistically intersect
with more modern anti-humanisms?
• In what ways might medieval and more modern studies, with respect
to the vigorous debates over the value (or lack thereof) of the liberal
humanities, form productive alliances across the Enlightenment
divide?
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• What is the role of the individual, singular person in relation to con-
cepts of humanism, past and present?
• What is the role of language and literature in relation to being, body,
and mind, past and present?
• Is it true, as some have argued, that the individual (and a concomi-
tant emphasis on phenomenological inwardness) is a product of
modernity (or, at least, of the post-Enlightenment), or has the self,
constructed in philosophy and other arts, always been “deep”?
• How does the interplay between singular corporalities and social
“bodies” affect our understanding of what it means to be human,
both in the past and in the present?
• What is the role of the Other (or more generally, alterity) in our con-
ceptions of humanism and “being human,” past and present?
• How might recent findings in cognitive science—such as, “The mind
is inherently embodied,” “Thought is mainly unconscious,” and
“Reason is not dispassionate, but emotionally engaged” (Lakoff and
Johnson 3, 4)—affect how we might re-think our university humani-
ties curricula and teaching practices?
• Can we have, as the psychologist Abraham Maslow advocated for in
the 1960s, a “humanistic biology” which is not morally neutral or
value free, and which seeks to make us “wiser, more virtuous, hap-
pier, more fulfilled” (20)?
• If the definitive politics of our time (and likely in the foreseeable fu-
ture as well) is biopolitics, how might premodern studies intervene
into this politics, with the hope of securing a place for a radically lib-
eral new humanism or post-humanism within that politics?
• Is humanism a philosophy, or set of ideas, or a historically-situated
socio-critical practice, that has lost its raison d’etre, such that it is
time for a new humanism or no humanism at all?
It is this last question, especially, with which BABEL could be said to
be obsessed. There is no doubt that humanism—especially of the variety
in which, in Iain Chambers’ words, “the human subject is considered sov-
ereign, language [is] the transparent medium of its agency, and truth [is]
the representation of its rationalism” (2–3)—has a terrible reputation and
has been responsible for some of the worst atrocities perpetrated in history
(torture, cruel medical experimentation, campaigns of disenfranchisement
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of persons’ homes and possessions, apartheid, slavery, ethnic cleansing,
gulags, genocide, etc.). Furthermore, we are aware that any attempt to re-
cuperate humanism now may always come too late if, as Foucault sup-
poses in the conclusion to The Order of Things, “man” has already been
“erased,” like “a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (387). Never-
theless, it is BABEL’s hope that a new humanism could be formulated that
would be perpetually subject to rigorously critical self-examinations as
well as it would be vigilantly cared for and safeguarded.21 There are good
reasons, we believe, for hanging on to the idea of the possibility of a recu-
perated and recuperative humanism in an age in which humans and other
living beings are among the world’s chief industrial waste products,
“squatopolises” are becoming mega-cities, and secret economies such as
human and human organ trafficking are thriving.22 While we are fully
aware that, historically, humanism and the human have a long and trou-
bling history that implicates them in violent exclusions, as well as in de-
privations and disenfranchisements of all sorts, we would also aver that
humanism (of different philosophical varieties) has also been responsible
for heroic acts of psychic and material sustenance, rescue and redemption,
mutually-productive alliance and overcoming, and personal freedom. It is
not a question of having some sort of scale that allows us to measure
whether humanism has led to more atrocities than it has to social and other
boons, but rather, of acknowledging that it has done both, in separate
times and places, and simultaneously, such that in a particular street in a
particular city at a particular point in time, in a room on the second story
of a house, one so-called humanist was engaging in an act of cruelty un-
derwritten and approved of in his philosophy, while in another room on
the first floor of that same house, and from reading the same books, an-
other so-called humanist was engaging in a radical, even illegal, act of
kindness. And our job, as scholars working within inherited humanistic
traditions we are reluctant to discard entirely, is to understand as well as
we can this complex and complicated history of humanism and to decide:
what is salvageable and what must be put away forever? 
In this sense, BABEL desires what Martin Halliwell and Andy Mousley
have termed a critical or “baggy” humanism that “takes the human to be an
open-ended and mutable process” (2). And like Halliwell and Mousley, we
wish to develop a humanism that is “both a pluralistic and a self-critical tra-
dition that folds in and over itself, provoking a series of questions and
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problems rather than necessarily providing consolation or edification for in-
dividuals when faced with intractable economic, political, and social pres-
sures” (16). This is a humanism that also acknowledges, with Chambers,
that “Being in the world does not add up, it never arrives at the complete
picture, the conclusive verdict. There is always something more that ex-
ceeds the frame we desire to impose” (2). Alongside this valuable insight,
BABEL wishes, if even temporarily, to hang on to the terms “human,” “hu-
manity,” and “humanism,” not because they are meaningful ideas or states
of affairs in and of themselves (because their value is somehow, ipso facto,
obvious), or because they adequately “frame” who we are and what we do,
but because we believe we need these terms as always-open sites for con-
tinual explorations and forays into what we think we may be at any given
moment. Biologically and historically speaking, and regardless of our abil-
ities to enter into processes of “becoming posthuman” or “becoming inhu-
man” with and alongside others (human, animal, machine, or otherwise),
ultimately, at some level, we are thus and not thus. Regardless of the names
we give ourselves, or even of our capacities for transformation beyond our-
selves, there must be a way to account for our difference that does not do
violence to others and that could even enhance the possibilities for a greater
share of happiness and well-being for a greater share of the living forms
that together inhabit this world. We are thus and not thus. What is our
given-ness, however minimal, the place from which we begin to go
forth?23 What are the possibilities, partially determined by our given-ness,
available to us? What, further, given our given-ness (for our being at all is
a sort of gift), are our responsibilities as intellectuals, but also as humanists:
How do we re-give? It is to these questions, and with all the powers of pre-
and postmodern critical thought and scientific understanding we can muster
from whatever corners, that BABEL would like to see a new humanism, by
whatever name, address itself.
As regards our more narrow purview—literature, history, philosophy,
narrative and critical theory, and the arts—BABEL is especially con-
cerned with developing a new, “baggy,” and critical humanism that
would explore: 1) the significance (historical, socio-cultural, psychic,
etc.) of individual freedom, expression, and affectivity; 2) the impact of
technology and new sciences on what it means to be an individual or
self; 3) the importance of art and literature (and therefore, obviously,
language) to defining and enacting the human; 4) the importance of
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history in defining and re-membering the human; 5) the transformational
possibilities inherent in the human, and how those transformational pos-
sibilities help us to see how the human can be redefined as something
open and not closed (and how such has always been the case); and 6) the
question of what might be called a human collectivity or human “join”:
what is the value, or peril, of “being human” or “being inhuman”
together?
* * *
In addition to its edited volume of essays, Cultural Studies of the Modern
Middle Ages, this special issue of the Journal of Narrative Theory repre-
sents one of BABEL’s first forays into a collaborative and “baggy” hu-
manistic scholarship between medieval studies, more contemporary hu-
manistic studies, and the sciences, with the objective of interrogating
together the open terms, “human,” “humanity,” “humanism,” and “the hu-
manities.” Gathered together in this issue are the thought and writing of
four scholars of early and late medieval English literature (Eileen A. Joy,
Christine M. Neufeld, Robin Norris, and Myra J. Seaman), one historian
of early medieval Europe (Michael E. Moore), one Victorianist (Maria K.
Bachman), one critical theorist (Doryjane Birrer), and one social scientist
(Michael Uebel). The essays gathered here represent a collective attempt,
as Michael Moore writes in his essay, at “paying careful attention to the
lives of others, living and dead, real and fictional,” in order to begin to
enact a more affective and affecting humanities studies. Such studies de-
mand, following Derrida, that we be willing to be unfaithful to our habit-
ual disciplinary practices, such that a medievalist might reflect upon
Margery Kempe, science fiction, and Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel Never Let
Me Go (Seaman), Homer and the Iraq War (Norris), or Alcuin of York and
the poetry of Czeslaw Milosz (Moore), and a modernist might be found
ruminating upon Edward Said’s democratic criticism and medieval were-
wolves (Birrer), a Victorianist upon mental cognitive functioning and nar-
rative attachment disorder (Bachman), and a psychotherapist upon Gestalt
and marine ecology (Uebel).
The issue begins with Michael Moore’s essay, “An Historian’s Notes
for a Miloszan Humanism,” a proposal for a humanism in the spirit of the
poetry of Czeslaw Milosz that, like its predecessors in the medieval and
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early modern periods, seeks a renewal of the self through its contact with
the past, but which does not follow the well-trodden paths of “humanizing
the world” that has been marred by the boot prints of too many armies. In-
stead Moore invites us to consider a model of humanism that would seek
to “humanize the self” through the “ethical imperative of recollection.”
Moore models his revised and self-critical humanism—a contemplative
mode that seeks to “discover new critical and artistic paths” in its study of
the past—on the intellectual labors of Carolingian scholars, the musings of
late medieval mystics, and, above all, the poetry of Milosz and George
Mackay Brown, artists of a disenchanted era who, even in the face of po-
litical devastation and the dissolution of the idea of a universal “human-
ity,” labor to honor the claims the dead, our dead, still have on us. In her
essay, “A New Species of Humanities: The Marvelous Progeny of Hu-
manism and Postmodern Theory,” Doryjane Birrer also addresses the crit-
icisms leveled at humanism, exploring in particular the scholarly debate
between traditional humanists and postmodern theorists, where each fac-
tion casts its antagonist as a monstrous Other in a pitched battle to deter-
mine the fate of the humanities. Wary of such binary thinking, and in-
spired by medieval and more modern narratives of “humane” werewolves,
Birrer interrogates the idea of the “familiar at the heart of the [monstrous]
unfamiliar.” Drawing upon the popular television series Buffy the Vampire
Slayer as well as the fourteenth-century Middle English romance William
of Palerne, Birrer outlines what is at stake in the humanist-antihumanist
debate along with some of its fallacies, and proposes that those of us
working in the humanities embrace the idea of an uncanny hybrid, a mar-
velous union of “humanist self-assertion” and “postmodernist self-
critique” that would thrive on the tension between certain unassimilable
principles and aims.
Myra Seaman also looks to medieval werewolves, as well as science
fiction, in order to investigate conceptions of the posthuman in her essay
“Becoming More (than) Human: Affective Posthumanisms, Past and Pre-
sent.” Seaman examines the often paradoxical role of embodiment in fu-
turistic visions such as the most recent Battlestar Galactica television se-
ries, the film Dark City, and Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel Never Let Me Go, all
of which imagine the material and psychic effects of posthuman societies
irrevocably changed by certain advances in techno-science. Even as the
perceived imperfections of the human body have supposedly been over-
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come, these narratives consistently align human “essence” with bodily
vulnerabilities and a concomitant affectivity that engenders empathy, self-
understanding, love, and art. For Seaman, this privileging of emotional af-
fect resonates with particular aspects of medieval thought and experience,
where certain notions of the human-Other hybrid, “as a more developed,
more advanced, or more powerful version of the existing self,” especially
in Christian theology, were intimately connected to empathy and suffer-
ing. As Seaman illustrates, whether it is constituted as medieval werewolf,
ecstatic religious experience, or futuristic human-machine hybrid, the
posthuman contests the valorization of Reason and Science in order to re-
tain a humanity that defines itself primarily through its emotive and other
fragilities. The medieval past and contemporary present also illuminate
one another in Robin Norris’s consideration of mourning rituals in her
essay, “Mourning Rights: Beowulf, the Iliad, and the Iraq War.” Examin-
ing the nature of grief and memorialization in traditional heroic epics,
Norris reminds us of “our duty to remember,” a duty that, in contemporary
times, extends beyond the individual aristocratic warrior hero to include
the soldiers Shakespeare’s Falstaff refers to as “cannonfodder” as well as
the civilians caught in the crossfire of national and international disputes.
As she contemplates the public debates in the U.S. surrounding Casey
Sheehan’s burial and his mother Cindy Sheehan’s protest of the Iraq War
through a campaign of extended mourning, as well as the responses to the
funeral disruptions orchestrated by Fred Phelps and his Westboro Baptist
Church, Norris exposes the claims we make upon our dead, even as she re-
minds us of the many human casualties that still escape our attention.
Moreover, Norris highlights the ways in which the transmission of sorrow
through the technology of poetry “is an experience unique to human be-
ings, to being human,” and how reading such poetry “subjects Homo sapi-
ens to a contagious mourning that allows us to weep for individuals we’ve
never met, and who may have never even existed.”
Drawing upon cognitive science, narrative theory, moral philosophy,
and evolutionary psychology in her essay “Who Cares? Novel Reading,
Narrative Attachment Disorder, and the Case of The Old Curiosity Shop,”
Maria Bachman examines how empathetic concern for others is cogni-
tively and emotionally mediated in fiction in such a manner that may actu-
ally limit our ability to care for others. Exploring moments of “narrative
inattention” in a novel known in its time for “its ennobling appeal to emo-
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tion,” Bachman focuses in particular on the cognitive biases of Dickens’s
child protagonist “little Nell,” and points our attention to what Nell (and
by implication, audiences) choose not to observe, their lack of curiosity
for the characters or minor episodes that inhabit the “narrative border-
lands” of fictional worlds and that make up the larger, often faceless
“stream of life.” Considering this dilemma within the context of neuro-
science, Bachman determines that a certain “neuroplasticity” and Darwin-
ian hierarchy of care has moral implications affecting not just how we read
novels, but also how we “perceive, categorize, and act in the real world.”
Michael Uebel’s essay, “B(eing)-Students,” although addressed to certain
currents in humanist psychology, education, and marine ecology and not
to novels or novel reading, shares with Bachman’s essay a concern that
“learning about the world is only as important or as necessary as learning
about how we prevent ourselves from doing so.” Bringing together the hu-
manistic, Gestalt, and “Being”-psychology of Abraham Maslow, Carl
Rogers and others from the 1950s and 1960s, the philosophical thought of
Martin Buber, Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogics, and the ecological work of the
Depression era biologist Edward Ricketts, Uebel formulates an approach
to learning that would be “mindfully present”—“receptive, nonjudgmen-
tal, and reflective”—and that would emphasize “affective empowerment.”
Uebel argues for attentiveness to “the spaces in between,” the “boundary
event that amounts to a process of relational intentionality,” where the
classroom is a “shared field of knowledge,” and the acts of teaching and
learning a “dance.” The B-student, who is a “Being-student,” is one who
“recognizes that the outer, visible manifestations of invisible fields of
force are only responsible for the unique pattern and form of individual in-
stances of social and community life. Of much greater significance are the
usually unacknowledged and always intangible webs of relationships and
connections that subtly lead the social organism to the particular place we
find it at any given time.” Ultimately, in Uebel’s view, humanistic educa-
tion “has a stake in fostering the power to directly perceive one’s own
character in relation to or dialogue with others; that is, regarding problems
not as being ‘out there’ but rather as being claimable as one’s own respon-
sibility.” Uebel’s essay has important implications, we believe, not only
for educational philosophy, but also for narratological understanding, for
how we read and perceive the “the intangible webs of relationships and
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connections” within the texts we study, but also within the historical
worlds in which those texts are encountered at any given time.
As these essays hopefully demonstrate, the BABEL Working Group,
although a scholarly collective with a special emphasis on premodern
studies, is also interested in tracing, in collaboration with scholars work-
ing in more modern humanities disciplines, and with scientists and so-
cial scientists, what William Connolly has described as “dissonant con-
junctions”: “In every moment, the pressures of the past enter into
dissonant conjunction with uncertain possibilities of the future. The
fugitive present is both constituted by this dissonant conjunction be-
tween past and present and rendered uncertain in its direction by it”
(145). BABEL is interested, in other words, with time, with all of the
any given times, and by extension, with all the ways in which various
temporalities—dissonant, irregular, and otherwise—intersect and help to
shape our life and thought. Which means BABEL, even with its interests
in thing supposedly “dead” and “past,” is intensely focused on the pre-
sent moment of both the university and also the larger world, to which
we believe humanism and its attendant humanities have always directed
themselves. In other words, for BABEL, following the thinking of Ed-
ward Said, the canonical texts of humanism and the humanities (which
include Uebel’s humanistic psychology),
far from being a rigid tablet of fixed rules and monuments
bullying us from the past—like Wagner’s Beckmesser
marking the youthful Walther’s mistakes in Die Meis-
tersinger—will always remain open to changing combina-
tions of sense and signification; every reading and interpre-
tation of a canonical work reanimates it in the present,
furnishes an occasion for rereading, allows the modern and
the new to be situated together in a broad historical field
whose usefulness is that it shows us history as an agonistic
process still being made, rather than finished and settled
once and for all. (25)
Moreover, with Martha Nussbaum, we agree that there must be such a
thing as “poetic justice,” if we want to believe that it is possible, through a
particular sort of imaginative immersion in the study of literary, historical,
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scientific, and other arts, to answer in the affirmative Whitman’s questions,
in Song of Myself, “Do you hold . . . love for those hardening to maturity?
for the lastborn? little and big? and for the errant?” (qtd. in Nussbaum
1995, 120).
In his important essay, “The University Without Condition,” Derrida
argued that, if a “concept of man seems both indispensable and always
problematic . . . it can be discussed or reelaborated, as such and without
conditions, without presuppositions, only within the space of the new
Humanities” (203). This “new Humanities” would be one, in Derrida’s
view, which would “treat the history of man, the idea, the figure, and the
notion” only “on the basis of a nonfinite series of oppositions by which
man is determined, in particular the traditional opposition of the life
form called ‘human’ and of the life form called ‘animal’” (231). And al-
though the university “without conditions” (a university that would be
completely free and independent of obligations to anything but the truth)
does not, strictly speaking, exist, “it should remain an ultimate place of
critical resistance—and more than critical—to all the powers of dog-
matic and unjust appropriation” (204). This unconditional university,
further, would constitute “the principal right to say everything, even if it
be under the heading of fiction and the experimentation of knowledge,
and the right to say it publicly, to publish it” (205). Finally, the humani-
ties would have a privileged place in this unconditional university, be-
cause the very principle of unconditionality
has an originary and privileged place of presentation, of
manifestation, of safekeeping in the Humanities. It has
there its space of discussion and reelaboration as well. All
this passes as much by way of literature and languages
(that is, the sciences called the sciences of man and culture)
as by way of the nondiscursive arts, by way of law and phi-
losophy, by way of critique, questioning, and, beyond criti-
cal philosophy and questioning, by way of deconstruc-
tion—where it is a matter of nothing less than rethinking
the concept of man, the figure of humanity in general, and
singularly the one presupposed by what we have called, in
the university, for the last few centuries, the Humanities.
(207)
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Derrida’s thinking here accords well with Readings’ reflections, in-
voked at the beginning of this essay, that the University (capitalized to
indicate its historical status as an ideal and idealized institution), how-
ever “ruined,” must strive toward building a “community that is not
made up of subjects but singularities”: this community would not be
“organic in that its members do not share an immanent identity to be re-
vealed,” and it would not be “directed toward the production of a uni-
versal subject of history, to the cultural realization of an essential human
nature” (185). Rather, this would be a community “of dissensus that pre-
supposes nothing in common,” and that “would seek to make its het-
eronomy, its differences, more complex” (190). In this scenario, the
posthistorical university would be “where thought takes place beside
thought, where thinking is a shared process without identity or unity”—
this is ultimately “a dissensual process; it belongs to dialogism rather
than to dialogue,” and instead of a new interdisciplinary space that
would “reunify” the increasingly fragmented disciplines, there would be
a “shifting disciplinary structure that holds open the question of whether
and how thoughts fit together” (192).
This, finally, is where the BABEL Working Group locates itself: within
the rubble of Readings’ University in ruins which is also Derrida’s univer-
sity without condition as event to come—this is the queer space, or hetero-
topia, that theorist Michael O’Rourke, following the thought of Derrida,
has so lovingly delineated as “roguishly relational in its opening to disci-
plinary neighbors in ‘an infinite series of possible encounters’ . . . open to
the other, the future . . . the coming or love of the other” (36). Because
BABEL cannot say for certain what the outcomes of its work might be, or
might never be, and because it cannot know in advance whether the
human will have pride of place in its philosophy or will sit to the side of
something else, its chief commitment is the cultivation of a more mindful
“being-together” with others who work alongside us in the ruined towers
and Babels of the past. BABEL roams and stalks these ruins as a multi-
plicity, a pack, looking for other roaming packs and multiplicities with
which to cohabit. We seek to build desiring-machines for which no “join”
that can be thought is withheld from our embrace, and in which embrace a
more capacious and generous humanism might arrive, and if only briefly,
come to rest and dwell in the queer space that is among us.
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Notes
The formulation of BABEL’s philosophies and projects is a continually ongoing and per-
petually self-transforming process that relies upon the generous provocations to thought of
its various members and also its non-members. We wish to thank here especially the com-
mentators at the medieval studies group weblog In The Middle (http://jjcohen.
blogspot.com), who have tirelessly helped BABEL to fashion and refashion its mission:
Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, Mary Kate Hurley, Nicola Masciandoro, N50 (a.k.a. “srj”), Michael
O’Rourke, Dan Remein, Karl Steel, and Michael Uebel. We wish to also thank the mem-
bers of the BABEL Working Group who helped to organize and preside over the multiple
conference sessions that led to this issue: Betsy McCormick and Myra Seaman.
1. See, for example, LaCapra, “The University in Ruins,” where he argues that the con-
temporary American academy is not as much a “transnational bureaucratic corpora-
tion” as it “is based on a systematic, schizoid division between a market model and a
model of corporate solidarity and collegial responsibility” (32). Further, LaCapra ar-
gues that Readings insistence on the fact that “the older ideals of culture, Bildung, the
liberal subject-citizen, and the nation-state are no longer relevant” in the contemporary
academy belies the fact, in LaCapra’s view, that these things were always phantasms
or idealizations, “made to cover a much more complex and changing constellation of
forces that varied with nation, region, and group” (38, 39). LaCapra also wonders,
“with respect to the present.” if “culture, ideology, and the nation-state are as evacu-
ated or obsolete as Readings believes” (39). See also Royle, “Yes, Yes, the University
in Ruins,” and LaCapra, “Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes . . . Well, Maybe: Response to Nicholas
Royle.”
2. On the idea of post-histoire, and the debates over whether or not history has, indeed,
come to an end, see Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Baudrillard, The
Illusion of the End, and Niethammer, Post-Histoire.
3. See Moravec, Mind Children and Robot, and Steels and Brooks, eds., The Artificial
Life Route to Artificial Intelligence. On the idea that artificial systems of intelligence
will one day supersede human beings, see also Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Ma-
chines.
4. On the idea of future races of super-humans, see also Stock, Metaman and Redesign-
ing Humans, and Silver, Remaking Eden.
5. According to Bennett, Deleuze and Guattari’s “body without organs” (or, BwO) can be
described as a “human body working itself out of its organ-ization as an organic
whole. BwO is never an achieved state. It is a multispecied and ongoing project of be-
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coming in which new links are forged among ‘things, plants, animals, tools, people,
power, and fragments of all of these.’ BwO is the weird science of self-rehybridiza-
tion.” Further, “BwO is a social creature,” and “the extent of its networks of implica-
tion go beyond the social to include alliances with nonhumans, the inorganic, the
imaginary, and other ‘planes of consistency.’ According to Deleuze and Guattari, BwO
is a creature that hovers between human and nonhuman being, between who-ness and
it-ness” (24). 
6. On the processes of “detraditionalization” that leave the late modern individual in a
position of precarious insecurity, see also Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity,
“Living in a Post-Traditional Society,” and Modernity and Self-Identity.
7. The reason the “second” modern individual is “reflexive,” as opposed to “reflective”
(with “reflective” denoting the individual’s supposed ability to subsume an object
under a subject of knowledge), according to Lash, is because he or she never has time
to reflect, only to quickly and reflexively make decisions and choices—decisions,
moreover, that must be continuously re-thought and re-chosen because knowledge is
always, in late modernity, uncertain, “probabilistic, at best; more likely ‘possibilistic’”
(x).
8. The “individualization argument,” as Beck and Beck-Gernsheim phrase it, is integral
to Beck’s more well-known “risk argument,” in which he has argued that a totalizing,
globalizing economy, in conjunction with new, accelerated technologies, demystified
norms of knowledge, perpetual self-reflexivity, and non-traditional social configura-
tions, has brought about unprecedented social hazards and irreversible threats to the
life of the planet. See Beck, Risk Society.
9. For a current overview of work in cognitive science that affirms Varela’s ideas of “en-
action” and the “embodied mind,” see Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh.
10. On the idea of the self as a collection of “some-nesses” of being, figured by Deleuze
and Guattari as “n minus 1,” see Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 6.
11. For work in feminist philosophy that draws upon Darwin, as well as upon Derrida,
Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, Nietzsche, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty, in order to
explicate how the human self is largely a production of inhuman, impersonal or pre-
personal, and subhuman “forces of becoming,” such as biology and temporality, see
Grosz, The Nick of Time and Time Travels.
12. Although a biologist and a cognitive scientist, Varela is also a Buddhist whose work is
inflected by certain ethical propensities, such that he is as concerned with deconstruct-
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ing as well as recuperating certain aspects of what is understood by the “liberal hu-
manist subject.” On this point see Hayles 156–57.
13. For more information on the history, mission statements, and ongoing projects of the
BABEL Working Group, see http://www.siue.edu/babel/.
14. See, especially, McGann, Radiant Textuality and Landow, Hypertext 3.0.
15. See also Herman, ed., Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences, Hogan, Cognitive
Science, Literature, and the Arts, Richardson and Spolski, The Work of Fiction, Turner,
The Literary Mind, Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction, and the special issue of Poetics
Today, “Literature and the Cognitive Revolution.”
16. On this point, see the overview of “Technological Humanisms” in chapter 8 of Halli-
well and Mousley, Critical Humanisms 159–79.
17. The list of members of Edge (http://www.edge.org/) and Brockman’s “Third Culture”
collective reads like a “who’s who” of the leading scientists, philosophers of science,
and social scientists of our times: Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, David Deutsch,
Jared Diamond, Freeman Dyson, Brian Greene, Marvin Minsky, Steven Pinker, Lee
Smolin, Sherry Turkle, J. Craig Venter, and E.O. Wilson, among many others.
18. See especially Brown, The Body and Society, and Bynum, Metamorphosis and Identity
and The Resurrection of the Body.
19. See Turner, The Body and Society, Csordas, ed., Embodiment and Experience, Feath-
erstone et al., eds., The Body, and Shilling, The Body and Social Theory.
20. For the most measured cautionary view, see Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future. See
also the special issue of The Hedgehog Review, “Technology and the Human Person.”
21. For a brief overview of the traditional humanist and more modern anti-humanist posi-
tions, see Davies, Humanism and Soper, Humanism and Anti-Humanism.
22. On these points see Bauman, Wasted Lives, David, A Planet of Slums, Neuwirth,
Shadow Cities, Scheper-Hughes, “The Global Trade in Human Organs,” and the re-
ports collected at Human Rights Watch on human trafficking, http://www.
hrw.org/women/trafficking.html.
23. In their book Critical Humanisms, Halliwell and Mousley argue that we must be criti-
cal of “various premature closures whereby one version of humanism is taken to be
representative of the whole . . . and whereby the human itself is taken to be a given,
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rather than contestable and criticisable.” However, they also aver that “too much open-
ness may lead to a complete loss of the human,” and therefore, “if the human does not
operate as some kind of given, the words like alienation, depersonalization and degra-
dation lose their evaluative and ethical force.” Further, “the notion of the endless plas-
ticity and pliability of the human . . . is tantamount to suggesting that human beings
can live under any conditions whatsoever” (10). We would concur. On the idea of a
new “critical humanism,” see also Todorov, On Human Diversity and The Imperfect
Garden.
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